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s a species, humans have long 
distinguished ourselves through our 
unique ability to conceive of increasingly 
efficient methods and technologies for 
separating death from our immediate 
experience.  Through the pursuit of this 
goal, we have fractured space and sight in 
such a way as to bring us to our present state 
of utter dissociation from the actions of 
those to whom we now outsource this 
violence.  We can only know what we see, 
or as John Berger writes: “We only see what 
we look at” (8).  I will argue that sight – in 
its raw, unmediated form – is a prerequisite 
to rational deliberation and ethical discourse.  
Further, I will suggest that the physical 
barriers to sight are supplemented by 
discursive constructions that further obscure 
the Other from those who would do them 
harm.  Only by acknowledging sight – 
conceived as encompassing interpersonal 
perception as such, including but not limited 
to the visual – as a political weapon, 
problematizing and charting the “frontiers of 
sequestered experience” (Giddens 169), can 
we begin to deconstruct these barriers and 
reassert the empathetic relationship to the 
Other as a prerequisite to moral deliberation.  
This study represents a sustained attempt to 
explore the physical and discursive 
techniques by which certain populations are 
framed as ungrievable, and therefore 
killable. 
Emmanuel Levinas utilizes the concepts 
of “totality” and “infinity” as a way of 
structuring the phenomenological 
experience of our relationship to the Other. 
When we face the Other with intentionality, 
we are seeing across an unbridgeable divide, 
an ontological abyss that is an experience of 
radical alterity and heterogeneity.  This 
chasm represents the impossibility of truly 
understanding another as they are in and for 
themselves.  This divide is infinite, and for 
Levinas is characterized by the attempt to 
cognize an experience that overflows 
thought itself.  It is this true excess of the 
Other that rends the totality under which we 
subsume our fellow beings.  Within the 
totality, we see through a mediating term or 
concept that functions as an attempt to 
bridge the infinite.  In this way, we 
understand the Other not as it is in itself but 
as a manifestation or element of some 
combination of categories.  Individuality 
becomes lost beneath a floating signifier – 
‘terrorist,’ ‘radical,’ ‘civilian,’ or perhaps 
even ‘beef’ and ‘pork’ – and such a fragile 
linguistic link is easily weaponized.  This 
initial schematization is a powerful form of 
violence, blurring lines, smoothing edges, 
and filling in voids to place beings neatly 
within concepts.  Only through the lens of 
the totality can we place and quantify 
individuals.  The pure vulnerability and 
exteriority of the Other is pacified and made 
manageable. 
For Levinas, the primary ethical 
relationship between beings is consummated 
in the experience of the face.  The face 
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should be here understood broadly, 
designating not (only) the literal face but an 
experience of the Other that reveals 
precarity and difference.  As Levinas writes, 
“[t]he way in which the Other presents 
himself, exceeding the idea of the Other in 
me, we here name face” (Levinas 50).  Here 
again, it becomes clear that Levinas is not 
suggesting that a literal face-to-face 
encounter is the sole foundation for 
empathy, but that this serves as a paradigm 
for understanding all other forms of 
encounter.  Conceived in this way, the face 
is the physical manifestation of the pure 
excess of infinity.  He writes that “The 
nakedness of the face is destituteness.  To 
recognize the Other is to recognize a 
hunger” (75).  That hunger demands 
response; to glimpse the face is to be placed 
into an asymmetrical relationship of infinite 
obligation (Critchley 49).  It is therefore 
possible “to recognize the gaze of the 
stranger, the widow, and the orphan only in 
giving or refusing” (Levinas 77).  The only 
choice remaining involves the question of 
fidelity: to give or refuse, which is nothing 
other than the temptation of totality. 
It is important to note that Levinas 
places the face-to-face relationship primarily 
through the metaphor of discourse.  This call 
and response, whether generosity or refusal, 
is for him a proto-conversation: “The eyes 
break through the mask – the language of 
the eyes, impossible to dissemble.  The eye 
does not shine; it speaks” (Levinas 66).  
This is the voice of Other, which, again, is to 
be understood broadly as the plea for 
recognition and mercy.  Through facing the 
Other in this way as an experience of the 
infinite, our existential egoism is shattered 
and called into question.  As Judith Butler, 
philosopher and Maxine Elliot Professor of 
Comparative Literature at the University of 
California-Berkeley, explains, “the face of 
the Other speaks to me from outside, and 
interrupts that narcissistic circuit.  The face 
of the Other calls me out of narcissism 
toward something finally more important” 
(Precarious Life 66).  This egoism, which 
Levinas understands as the truest form of 
atheism, the denial of the infinite, is 
shattered in the experience of the face-to-
face. 
Butler deals with Levinas extensively in 
Precarious Life, and through her work we 
can see the relevance of Levinas for our 
present situation.  Butler understands the 
face primarily as that which “communicates 
what is human, what is precarious, what is 
injurable” (xvii).  The voice, that which is 
communicated through the face but which is 
not necessarily vocal is “agonizing, 
suffering” (133).  Thus, the face to face 
relation becomes a process of awakening “to 
what is precarious in another life, or, rather, 
the precariousness of life itself” (134).  This 
precarity is fundamentally the vulnerability 
of the body: “the skin and the flesh expose 
us to the gaze of others, but also to touch, 
and to violence” (26).  Butler here 
emphasizes the importance of the dialectic 
of the Other and the Same for the moral 
experience: acknowledging a common 
bodily fragility provides a sympathetic 
bridge to the acknowledgment of a more 
basic and non-traversable alterity.  This 
experience of ultimate vulnerability must 
take place in order to comport oneself 
ethically toward the Other. 
In examining the political import of the 
concept of precarity, Butler introduces the 
notion of ‘grievable’ life.  As she writes, 
“some lives are grievable, and others are 
not; the differential allocation of grievability 
that decides what kind of subject is and must 
be grieved, and which kind of subject must 
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not, operates to produce and maintain 
certain exclusionary conceptions of who is 
normatively human” (xv).  The 
determination of who, or what, is grievable 
is a political act, and takes place first in the 
public sphere through discursive violence.  
Dehumanization, for Butler, is not only 
achieved through metaphor, but is also 
accomplished through omission.  Those 
whose lives are determined, in discourse, to 
be ungrievable, are in a sense erased from 
the field of moral concern: “Those who are 
unreal have, in a sense, already suffered the 
violence of derealization… They cannot be 
mourned because they are always already 
lost, or, rather, never ‘were’” (33). The 
obvious implication of this is not only the 
question of whose lives will count as such, 
but also whose deaths will count as deaths 
(xx-xxi).  
This question of who, and what, is real is 
thus primarily a function of what we are able 
to see and the medium through which we see 
it.  Can the face-to-face take place in the 
digital age?  In Frames of War, Butler 
problematizes the visual medium as a site 
where derealization occurs prior to the 
encounter.   She writes that “instruments 
also use persons (position them, endow them 
with perspective, and establish the trajectory 
of their action); they frame and form anyone 
who enters into the visual or audible field, 
and accordingly, those who do not” (Frames 
of War xii).  Her understanding of the frame, 
both visual and discursive, as a tool to 
render persons as such (or not), will be 
fundamental to the examples in this paper.  
For Butler, the framing of an event is not a 
neutral, impartial view of a moment in time; 
it is rather an active force in 
“instrumentalizing certain versions of 
reality” (xiii).  What is most crucial for our 
purposes is her argument that the frame of 
an event is itself a weapon, “selectively 
producing and enforcing what will count as 
reality” (xiii), and that the visual and 
discursive framing of lives as ungrievable is 
itself “not just preparation for a destruction 
to come, but the initiating sequence of the 
process of destruction” (xvi).  In short, this 
psychic violence, more than simply a 
prerequisite, is in fact a vital component of 
the physical violence that follows and 
consummates it: “they are deprived of life 
before they are killed, transformed into inert 
matter or destructive instrumentalities, and 
so buried before they have had a chance to 
live, or to become worthy of destruction, 
paradoxically, in the name of life” (xxix). 
Here, the work of the Italian philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben in his decades-long Homo 
Sacer project reveals its urgency: the 
decision of whose deaths will count as such, 
will be grieved, is a function of sovereign 
power.  Agamben understands the body as 
the site of a fundamental split through which 
the individual is revealed as both a 
biological organism and a political being – 
the “fundamental categorical pair of 
Western politics” (2).  In this dichotomy, 
zoē represents “the simple fact of living 
common to all living beings (animals, men, 
or gods)” – bare, reproductive life, 
historically excluded from the political 
sphere – while bios is more properly 
understood as the public, political life of the 
individual or group (2).  Agamben identifies 
the “politicization of bare life as such” to be 
“the decisive event of modernity” (4).  The 
homo sacer (sacred man), the concept that 
forms the height of his project, represents 
that which “may be killed and yet not 
sacrificed” (4, emphasis original), 
understood here primarily as the space in 
which “it is permitted to kill without 
committing homicide” (83).  This 
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determination, who or what may be killed 
without having been murdered, is a 
determination that resides in centralized 
political authority – as Agamben writes, “it 
constitutes the original – if concealed – 
nucleus of sovereign power” (6).  The homo 
sacer, then, constitutes the basic form by 
which we can understand Butler’s notion of 
ungrievable life: it is a life that can be taken 
without consequences, juridical or 
otherwise. 
Before moving on, we must negotiate a 
point of tension between Butler’s notion of 
precarity and Agamben’s dichotomy of zoē 
and bios.  Recall that for Agamben, zoē is 
characterized as “simple natural life” or 
“merely reproductive life” – life 
“confined… to the sphere of the oikos, 
‘home’” (2).  There is a clear difference in 
these descriptions.  Surely there is a certain 
distance between the idea of a private sphere 
and that of pure biological necessity.  What 
concerns Butler is precisely this process by 
which “a population is cast out of the polis 
and into bare life, conceived as an 
unprotected exposure to state violence” 
(Who Sings the Nation-State? 37). However, 
when Agamben describes the homo sacer, 
he is describing entire populations for which 
this distinction is ambiguous – those whose 
lives have lost any political import but who 
are nevertheless politicized in terms of mere 
life as such.  Butler criticizes Agamben on 
this point in reference to the people of Gaza: 
“any effort to establish such an exclusionary 
logic depends upon the depoliticization of 
life and, once again, writes out the matters 
of gender, menial labor, and reproduction 
from the field of the political” (38). 
The question then becomes whether 
Agamben’s analysis is not blind to a form of 
life among the marginalized and 
dispossessed that is, for all its precarity, not 
reducible to the body.  The disagreement 
here could perhaps be explained as a matter 
of perspective.  Butler represents the stark 
facts of these precarious lives in their daily 
experiences, while Agamben’s analysis is 
focused on determining how these concepts 
function at the level of the state.  There can 
be little doubt that Agamben recognizes the 
struggles and hopes of vulnerable 
communities as they navigate their day-to-
day existence – in many ways his project is 
a sustained engagement with this very idea.  
However, the fact remains that from the 
perspective of the state, their lives are 
depoliticized.  Their being homo sacer does 
not rely on their consent, not does it imply 
that they have abandoned the political.  
What this transition does require, however, 
is that from the perspective of sovereign 
power they have become ungrievable and 
thus disposable. 
Having come this far, a crucial question 
arises concerning the juxtaposition alluded 
to in the title of this paper: what is the 
relationship between the ungrievable human 
life – the homo sacer – and the animal?  
Providing an answer to this question 
involves traversing the fantasy of an 
anthropocentric ontology and coming to 
terms with the animality common to all 
beings.  As James Stanescu, philosopher and 
professor at American University, writes, 
“we invest a vast amount of intellectual 
work in trying to figure out what separates 
and individuates the human species, rather 
than in what makes us part of a commonality 
with other lives” (“Species Trouble” 569).  
A great deal of ink has been spilled in the 
project of outlining and refining various 
traits and activities that might distinguish the 
human from the animal, all of which are 
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plagued with deep inconsistencies.1  
Sufficed to say, “[t]he declaration, “We are 
all animals,” is one that revolts, and indeed, 
seems an attack upon dignity itself” (570).  
The resulting ontological distinctions are 
motivated by this revulsion, as a way of 
producing a worldview that maintains a 
comfortable human exceptionalism.  Insofar 
as this activity can be understood as a way 
of preserving a special place for man at the 
pinnacle of a hierarchy of being, it can be 
equally seen as a method of delineating who 
and what is worthy of moral concern.  The 
stakes of this debate, it would seem, involve 
no less than an undermining of the entire 
edifice of humanism and the Enlightenment 
project of equitable social organization 
founded on the rights of man.  For if there is 
nothing to separate the human from the 
animal – if the animal also has bios – then 
one is confronted with the precarity of the 
nonhuman and the call to a flattened moral 
ontology. 
While Judith Butler rarely deals 
explicitly with the question of the animal in 
her work, a passage in Frames of War 
provides the possibility of a way forward: 
“if it is the “life” of human life that concerns 
us, that is precisely where there is no firm 
way to distinguish in absolute terms the bios 
of the animal from the bios of the human 
animal . . . there is no human who is not a 
human animal” (19).  In short, the human 
takes part in an animality common to all 
beings, and insofar as the human animal has 
a political existence then we cannot exclude 
the nonhuman from this category.  Why is 
this the case?  With Levinas, Butler 
understands the ethical relationship 
primarily in terms of the vulnerability 
                                                
1 For an extended discussion, see Mathew Calarco’s 
Zoographies (2008). 
expressed in the face, which we know is 
equally the body insofar as it “implies 
mortality, vulnerability, [and] agency” 
(Precarious Life 26).  If the body, and not 
some capacity for rational thought, is the site 
of precarity, then it cannot be bounded 
exclusively to the human.  Recognizing 
vulnerability in another human being is 
accomplished by recognizing this shared 
animality of flesh and blood.  As Stanescu 
writes apropos Butler, “[i]t is only by 
avowing our animality that we can also 
avow our precariousness” (“Species Trouble 
576).  What this suggests is that grievability 
and precarity are not categories that we in 
some way extend or expand to include the 
animal, but that these were never exclusive 
to the human in the first place. 
As we have seen, the ethical relationship 
to the Other is predicated on the ability and 
will to rend totality and experience the face.  
This implies the ability to see, which in the 
context of this study has two meanings: (1) 
the ability to literally see the Other, without 
the mediation of distance and technology; 
and (2) the ability to acknowledge the Other 
as such, understood as the absence of the 
mediation of the totalizing category of 
thought under which the Other is subsumed.  
In these different, but perhaps equally 
powerful ways, advances in technology and 
propaganda function in a way that renders 
the face to face impossible.  What is at stake 
in understanding the role of distance in the 
production of the ‘ungrievable’ is the 
recognition of the ability of sovereign power 
to frame lives as homo sacer: individuals 
that may be killed without having been 
murdered.  It is the stripping away of the 
political content and import of life (bios) to 
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reveal only its disposable, biological core 
(zoē).  What follows are two brief excurses 
on the role of distance – verbal and physical 
– in neutralizing otherwise-powerful ‘safety 
catches’ within the human psyche as they 
manifest in modern warfare and animal 
slaughter operations. 
 
The Bravery of Being Out of Range 
This section will serve to explicate the 
role of physical and technological distance 
in undermining the possibility of an 
effective face to face ethical relationship.  
While these two factors are related, and are 
in many cases two sides of the same coin, 
there are circumstances – such as in the case 
of imagery technology in drone warfare – 
when separate treatment is warranted.  
British sociologist Anthony Giddens defines 
such a “sequestration of experience” as the 
process whereby various spheres of activity 
are set apart from the everyday, including 
“madness; criminality; sickness and death; 
sexuality; and nature” (Giddens 156).  On 
his view, death has become a matter of 
technique, not moral deliberation, and as 
such is “routinely hidden from view” (162).  
Whether an indirect result of pragmatic 
considerations or as a deliberate and 
systematic attempt to conceal, this 
construction of a common experiential field 
among participants and observers can be 
understood in terms of Butler’s concept of 
the ‘frame.’  As will be shown, advances in 
technology and technique “actively 
participate in a strategy of containment, 
selectively producing and enforcing what 
will count as reality” (Frames of War xiii).  
The following question should be kept in 
mind during this section: is the Levinasian 
face to face, the experience of vulnerability 
as a call to radical empathy, still possible in 
the wake of the relentless mechanization, 
rationalization, and abstraction that 
characterizes modern methods of killing? 
The potential tactical advantage of this 
concealment should not be underestimated, 
for as David Grossman, psychologist and 
retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, 
writes, “Looking another human being in the 
eye, making an independent decision to kill 
him, and watching as he dies due to your 
action combine to form the single most 
basic, important, primal, and potentially 
traumatic occurrence of war” (On Killing 
31).  Providing barriers, sequestering these 
experiences, represents the removal of a 
significant empathetic “safety catch” (Pinker 
552) that could otherwise hinder effective 
combat operations.  The philosopher Mark 
Coeckelbergh discusses the moral 
ambiguities that accompany the forward 
progress of military technology, which he 
describes as “distancing technologies” (90).  
Of course, there is a strategic defensive 
advantage to this distance, but the gain is 
also psychological: “One can now kill at 
longer distance: this is less psychologically 
‘painful’ to the killer, the other is further 
away and may appear as a stranger, as ‘the’ 
enemy, as a puppet, as a target: as 
something-to-shoot-at, as something-to-be-
killed” (90).  Eric Markusen, former 
Professor of Sociology at Southwest 
Minnesota University and Research Director 
of the Danish Center for Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies in Copenhagen, describes 
the mutual evolution of physical and 
psychological distance in the context of 
aerial bombing: “The primary impetus for 
increased altitude was to outdistance the 
range of enemy flak, and new generations of 
bombers were designed to fly ever higher… 
[This] meant that many crews virtually 
never saw the people or even buildings at 
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which they were aiming” (228-229).  
Coeckelbergh takes this example further: 
"When on August 6, 1945 at 8:15 
AM B-29 bomber Enola Gay 
dropped an atomic bomb on the 
city of Hiroshima, the crew soon 
witnessed blinding light and a 
mushroom- shaped cloud, covering 
the entire city in smoke and fire … 
They didn’t see how the skin of 
their victims was bleeding and 
burning. They didn’t see people 
that looked “like walking ghosts,” 
as a survivor described them. They 
didn’t see the suffering and death 
of men, women, and children." 
(87) 
What this suggests is that the lack of 
proximity to the ‘target’ during aerial 
bombing operations, while tactically 
beneficial, results in a significant loss of 
normal empathetic cues that would 
otherwise serve as a psychological barrier to 
killing, and that this loss of affect occurs 
along a continuum that includes military 
technologies as diverse as spears, arrows, 
rifles, and drones. 
While the industrial animal 
slaughterhouse does not create the sort of 
linear physical distance that characterizes 
modern military technology, it nevertheless 
utilizes a “meticulous partitioning of space” 
to render the act of killing nearly invisible to 
employees (Pachirat 84).  The internal 
geography of the slaughterhouse that 
Timothy Pachirat, Professor of Political 
Science at the University of Massachusetts-
Amherst, describes is such that the kill floor 
and the front office are “as far apart 
physically as possible without being 
separated into two distinct buildings,” with 
no interior route connecting them.  The 
bureaucratic division is just as stark, with all 
supervisory staff housed in their respective 
departments and having virtually no overlap 
or contact (39).  Strict dichotomies come to 
be enforced, justified through a combination 
of food safety standards and bureaucratic 
efficiency: clean and dirty, live and dead, 
visible and invisible (Vialles 35).  Pachirat 
emphasizes that “the division of labor on the 
kill floor works to fragment sight, to fracture 
experience, and to neutralize the work of 
violence” (159).  Those who work pre-kill 
see only living, breathing, animals to be 
handled and pushed through the chutes.  The 
much larger number who work post-kill see 
only an inert, bloodless substance to be 
processed in a cold, sterile environment 
(Vialles 35).  This discipline of sight and 
labor is replicated down to the lowest 
possible level, even the “inner sanctum” that 
contains the physical act of slaughter itself 
(Johnson 211; Vialles 39).  Among those 
who work on either end of this process, the 
fact that they cannot see the killing blow or 
that they do no actually perform it allows 
them to take comfort in their position of 
relative moral superiority and deny the 
process that they take part in.  It is worth 
quoting Pachirat at some length here to 
illustrate this complex moral calculus: 
"Only the knocker places the hot 
steel gun against the shaking, furry 
foreheads of creature after creature, 
sees his reflection in their rolling 
eyes, and pulls the trigger that will 
eventually rob them of life: only the 
knocker . . . And as long as the 1 
exists, as long as there is some 
plausible narrative that concentrates 
the heaviest weight of the dirtiest 
work on this 1, then the other 120 
kill floor workers can say, and 
believe it, 'I’m not going to take part 
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in this.  I’m not going to stand and 
watch this.'” (160) 
Thus, the sequestration of experience 
enforced within the modern slaughterhouse is 
able to foster a ‘hierarchy of disgust,’ in 
which the erasure of the act of killing from 
the eyes and memories of employees allows 
them to rationalize their continued 
involvement in the system that requires it. 
Having examined the effect of 
geography in neutralizing psychological 
barriers to killing, we must consider how 
technological advances can also obscure 
whatever “weak or imperfect moral 
connection” remains (Novek 127).  The 
technological medium of drone warfare can 
be said to transport flesh and blood human 
beings into the consequence-free logic of a 
video game.2 Grossman, writing in a time 
before the ubiquity of advanced imagery 
technology, described how night vision 
devices work to convert the enemy into an 
“inhuman green blob” (169).  These, along 
with telescopic sights and other technology, 
“lower some of the psychological barriers to 
illegitimate killing” (Sparrow 179).  Through 
a reliance on thermal-imagery in drone 
warfare, normal empathetic cues become 
neutralized through a “boring visual rhetoric” 
that takes the form of a “general aesthetic 
minimalism, bereft of even the most 
elementary forms of contrast, color, and 
content” (Ohi 617).  This facilitates an 
abstraction in which “any possibility of 
ethical recognition” is lost without a true 
encounter with the Other (Sparrow 181).  
Coeckelbergh’s analysis pushes the argument 
further, arguing that “If the other (dis)appears 
as ‘data,’ as ‘information,’ as ‘a dot on a 
                                                
2 This should not be taken to suggest that drone 
operators do not suffer severe psychological distress 
from their actions after the fact, but rather that the 
screen,’ as an entity within a computer game, 
then it is easier to push the button” (93).  
Through this technological dehumanization, 
the victim dies twice: “Epistemologically 
speaking, he is already killed before the 
missile hits him” (93). 
This first, technological death, also 
occurs in the production of meat, such that 
any understanding of the animal qua living 
being is lost.  The effect of mechanization in 
the slaughterhouse is such that the animal, 
held above and apart from the worker, 
becomes something else entirely – raw 
material awaiting production – and the 
worker, lost in the rational efficiency of the 
dis-assembly line, becomes numb to the 
reality of processing flesh.  These killing 
spaces were conceived from the outset as a 
completely rationalized and machinated 
space (Otter 96). Through taking full 
advantage of labor-saving technology, the 
worker’s interaction with the animal is 
effectively minimized as it becomes 
increasingly handled and transported by 
hooks, pulleys, and rails (96).  The 
introduction of this task-oriented, optimized 
approach to killing engendered a then-
unknown level of dissociation and 
detachment, a neutralization of the act of 
killing that left the workers themselves as 
“mere accomplices” in the efficiency and 
logic of the organization (Patterson 72).  
Taken to the extreme, the speed and 
quantities involved in the work engender 
their own form of psychological distance: 
“By the end of the day, by liver number 
2,394 or foot number 9,576, it hardly 
matters what is being cut, shorn, sliced, 
shredded, hung, or washed: all that matters 
immediate and visceral connection to the victim that 
would otherwise create a level of ambivalence in the 
moment of decision is severed. 
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is that the day is once again, finally, coming 
to a close” (Pachirat 139). 
This dis-assembly approach to meat 
production finds its origin in “a growing 
desire for hygienic, non-violent (that is, 
humane), and undetectable slaughter - 
ultimately, for a way to “harvest” meat that 
would essentially vegetalize the animal 
(Johnson 200). Though the kill floor was on 
a path to full mechanization, the physical act 
of slaughter was “stubbornly resistant” and 
still necessitated the “firm but delicate, 
trained hand of a sober slaughterman” (Otter 
96).  Slowly, however, technological 
innovation has placed even this last holdout 
of immediacy increasingly within the logic 
of efficiency and detachment.  Humane 
stunning technologies – bullets, pistols, bolts 
– provide not only a level of mechanical 
distance, but also serve to erase the combat 
of the kill and replace it with a clean, 
precise, and instant death.  The most 
extreme example of this is in the use of the 
‘trap,’ in which death is administered with 
the push of a button from a safe, separate 
location.  In the trap, “the animal is held 
apart from the man, who is then able to 
slaughter it in complete safety” (Vialles 
113), a process that severs once and for all 
any possible ethical relationship. 
The effects of this process of physical 
and technological distanciation are not 
limited to the individuals directly involved 
in the process.  The loss of any public 
connection to ‘outsourced killing’ lowers the 
threshold of legitimacy for military 
engagement abroad.  It is very likely that 
certain operations would not be taking place 
without advanced military robotics 
technologies, and low-level conflict will 
                                                
3 See Schulzke and Walsh; Kaag and Kreps; or Ryan, 
for example 
likely become ubiquitous as countries 
expand their drone technology programs.  
Through unprecedented geographic and 
technological distanciation that disconnects 
the soldier from the victim, and both from 
the weapon, drone warfare is able to create 
the conditions for a true “risk transfer war” 
in which less-developed nations take the 
majority of casualties (Monahan and Wall 
248).  Due to the nature of current 
asymmetric and neocolonial global conflicts, 
a disproportionate number of these deaths 
will be suffered by noncombatants 
(Huntington 50; Gusterson 201).  Images of 
flag-draped coffins are a sure way to erode 
the popularity of a large-scale military 
operation (the so-called “CNN” or “Dover” 
Effect) and wars without ‘boots on the 
ground’ have the unique advantage of not 
facing this threat to public support 
(Huntington 7-11; Kaag and Kreps 6).  An 
increase in the use of drones will allow 
administrations to wage any number of 
‘small wars’ with very little public interest 
or oversight, a “win-win proposition for the 
president, who could appear strong on 
defense without responsibility for body bags 
coming home” (Kaag and Kreps 65).   
In fact, many political analysts and 
military ethicists are now arguing that a 
reliance on unmanned strike capabilities will 
reduce inhibitions against going to war by 
lowering the threshold for violence.3  The 
United Kingdom acknowledges this 
explicitly in its Joint Doctrine Note 2/11, in 
which it is argued that the total reliance on 
drone technologies for conducting strikes in 
Pakistan and Yemen suggests that “the use 
of force is totally a function of the existence 
of an unmanned capability – it is unlikely a 
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similar scale of force would be used if this 
capability were not available” (5-9, 
emphasis added).  In short, the explicit 
‘benefit’ of drone technologies – that they 
save lives by removing soldiers from the 
battlefield – is not the complete truth: there 
are, and will continue to be, operations that 
are entirely a function of the availability of 
drones, such that were this technology not 
available these operations would not be 
carried out by other means. 
This logic applies to the slaughterhouse 
as well.  The conditions of modern 
agribusiness are such that the consumer has 
become utterly disconnected from the meat 
that they consume.  Unidentified, 
unsignposted, the ideal slaughterhouse looks 
like any other anonymous warehouse (Otter 
105).  It “turns a chameleon face outward, 
blending seamlessly into the local urban 
landscape” (Pachirat 84).   Having an 
existence separated from both the consumer 
and the producer, “the former could 
henceforth be unaware of the origin of the 
meat he was eating, the latter of the 
destination of the animal he reared" (Vialles 
27).  This separation increases the efficiency 
of commercial operations, while at the same 
time creating the necessary distance that 
“allows morally troubling acts, such as the 
disciplining of livestock, to proceed 
relatively free of public observation” 
(Novek 124).  The sequestration of killing 
“insulates consumers from the consequences 
- moral, ecological, economic - of their 
choices . . .  This results in more narrowly 
self-interested consumption decisions” 
(135).  In this sense, the sequestration of the 
slaughterhouse has succeeded in severing 
the tie between the eating and eaten 
animals.  “He consumes a substance that is 
anonymous, anodyne, and available in 
adequate quantities” (Vialles 28).  The 
conditions and ambiguities of its path from 
‘farm to table’ remain pleasantly out of 
sight. 
 
Human to Vermin / Steer to Steak 
In addition to the conduct of physical 
violence there is also a necessary 
psychological violence that occurs through a 
deliberate, discursive framework.  Through 
a process of euphemism and metaphor, 
peoples and actions take on new, distorted 
value and meaning.  While in many ways 
distinct from the physical act of killing, it 
would be a mistake to understand them 
separately: for Butler, this “implicit framing 
of a population as a war target is the initial 
act of destruction.  It is not just preparation 
for a destruction to come, but the initiating 
sequence of the process of destruction” 
(Frames of War xvi).  We have already 
discussed this concept as it manifests itself 
in the work of Levinas, for whom the 
‘totality’ represents a proto-violence, the 
initial destruction of the Other in its alterity.  
We subsume the Other beneath the totality 
to blunt the trauma of its vulnerability and 
radical ethical demand upon us.  This 
demand represents a significant tactical 
obstacle.  As Grossman writes, “[t]here is a 
constant danger on the battlefield that, in 
periods of extended close combat, the 
combatants will get to know and 
acknowledge one another as individuals and 
subsequently may refuse to kill each other” 
(158).  The response to this comes in the 
form of a careful program of psychological 
conditioning, with the explicit intent of 
discursively constructing ‘enemy’ 
populations as such.  The following question 
that should frame the discussion to come: is 
the infinite relation, conceived of as 
recognizing the obligation incurred in the 
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face to face, and representing a prerequisite 
for moral consideration, still possible while 
exposed to calculated, instrumentalized 
versions of reality? 
Before answering this question, we must 
first attempt to understand the potential 
power of language, and of thought, to shape 
our actions.  In Less Than Human, David 
Livingston Smith, Professor of Philosophy 
at the University of New England, examines 
the history and effects of dehumanizing 
rhetoric in war, and he emphasizes that these 
techniques are more a representation of how 
we think than of how we talk.  As he writes, 
“[c]alling people names is an effort to hurt 
or humiliate them.  It’s the use of language 
as a weapon.  But dehumanizing a person 
involves judging them to be less than 
human.  It’s intended as a description rather 
than as an attack, and as such is a departure 
from reality - a form of self-deception” (25).  
Violent thoughts, or in this case a false 
representation of the Other – which under 
the name of ‘totality’ we understand as an 
act of violence in itself – is a necessary step 
in the buildup to violent actions.  Smith 
continues this argument, writing that 
“[dehumanization] acts as a psychological 
lubricant, dissolving our inhibitions and 
inflaming our destructive passions.  As such, 
it empowers us to perform acts that would, 
under other circumstances, be unthinkable” 
(13). Taking a broader view, we can see the 
distance created through language as taking 
place not only in the object of violence, but 
also the techniques of killing.  In the context 
of this inquiry, we will examine how verbal 
distanciation techniques have been 
employed in recent history to break down 
normal psychological barriers to committing 
large-scale acts of violence. 
Central to this discussion will be the 
figure of the subhuman, which is a tricky 
ontological designation that suggests 
multiple interpretations.  For Smith, the 
human and the animal are best understood as 
two distinct sets, and dehumanization is a 
process by which a person is transferred 
from the status of human to that of animal.  
As he writes, “subhumans, it was believed, 
are beings that lack that special something 
that makes us human.  Because of this 
deficit, they don’t command the respect that 
we, the truly human beings, are obliged to 
grant one another” (Smith 2).  In this sense, 
either one is a human or one is not, and in 
the latter case one is exempt from the field 
of moral concern.  Author and historian 
Charles Patterson, by contrast, suggests a 
graded continuum with a separate subhuman 
status located on the barrier of the human 
and the animal (Patterson 22).  This 
ambiguous location serves multiple 
functions, including the maintenance of a 
certain human exceptionalism that even the 
process of dehumanization cannot erase, and 
the ability to import and export personality 
traits liberally across the divide.  In this way, 
“[n]egative perceptions of animals allowed 
people to project onto [the subhuman] 
qualities they did not like about themselves 
and helped them define themselves by 
contrasting animal behavior with what was 
alleged to be distinctive and admirable about 
human behavior” (24). This is why the 
phrase dehumanization, rather than 
animalization, is most appropriate in 
describing the framing of an individual as 
‘less than human.’  However, their not-
quite-animal, not-quite-human status still 
provides enough ontological distance from 
the world of men [sic] to deconstruct any 
psychological barriers to their “subjugation 
and domination” (26). 
The history of modern combat has left us 
with no shortage of material on which to 
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draw for examples of dehumanizing 
rhetoric, employed at the level of the state 
all the way down to the individual soldier.  
Smith’s account provides a brief overview 
of its deployment in World War II: to the 
Germans, the Jews were “rats”; to the 
Japanese, the Americans were depicted with 
“horns sprouting from their temples, and 
sporting tails, claws, or fangs” and described 
as “devils” or “dogs”; to the Allies, the 
Japanese were “often portrayed as monkeys, 
apes, or rodents, and sometimes as insects” 
(17-19).  An issue of the United States 
Marine Corps’ Leatherneck magazine 
featured “an illustration of a repulsive 
animal with a caterpillar-like body and a 
grotesque, stereotypically Japanese face, 
labeled Louses japonicas” (20).  Two 
decades later, “American troops referred to 
Vietnam as “Indian country” and called the 
Vietnamese “gooks,” “slopes,” and “dinks” 
(Patterson 43).  Grossman finds that the 
dehumanization of the Japanese was 
significantly aided by the cultural and 
physical differences that separated them 
from the West: as he writes, “44 percent of 
American soldiers in World War II said they 
would “really like to kill a Japanese soldier,” 
but only 6 percent expressed that degree of 
enthusiasm for killing Germans” (162).  
Denying the humanity of the opposing force 
is therefore a key task of the state’s 
propaganda machine (161).  As we can see, 
metaphor utilized in this sense is much more 
than a trick of language – it strategically 
both reflects and creates ways of thinking 
about another group in order to facilitate, in 
the minds of the public and of each soldier, 
their extermination en masse. 
There is, as has perhaps been noted by 
this point, an extremely problematic premise 
underlying this account: insofar as it relies 
on a division between the human and the 
animal, dehumanization – and in fact its 
general critique – is predicated on a human 
exceptionalism that can be somehow 
assigned or revoked.  It presupposes, and 
therefore leaves unchallenged, the 
assumption that if an individual is somehow 
‘less than human’ then this in and of itself 
legitimates their extermination.  Its critics, 
then, mobilize on behalf of the marginalized 
populations, arguing – correctly – that the 
use of animal metaphor is not only 
inaccurate (of course) but is an “ominous 
sign because it sets them up for humiliation, 
exploitation, and murder” (Patterson 28).  
Where, one might ask, are those who would 
speak on behalf of the animals that, even if 
one were to be successfully ‘animalized,’ 
this does and should not somehow authorize 
violence toward either group?  Kathryn 
Gillespie and Patricia Lopez, critical 
geographies and researchers in animal 
studies, in their Economies of Death, argue 
to this effect: 
"Using the language of 
‘dehumanization’ or ‘animalization’ to 
describe fundamentally exploitative 
processes reproduces the notion of 
human exceptionalism whereby 
humans, based on their species 
membership, are entitled to better 
treatment than nonhuman animals.  
Thus, ‘animalization’ as a discursive 
construct maintains the subordination 
of the actual animal as it leaves intact a 
system whereby it is acceptable to treat 
animals ‘like animals’” (2). 
A productive discourse surrounding the 
technique of verbal distanciation must go 
beyond the critique of dehumanization to 
encompass an understanding of the ways in 
which nonhuman animals are also, in their 
own way, made other and rendered as 
ungrievable. 
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This ‘otherization’ of the animal in the 
context of their being processed for human 
consumption is grounded not in vilification 
(as in the human context) but rather in the 
logic of economic rationalization.  This 
rhetoric descends, most famously if perhaps 
not originally, from the Cartesian notion 
according to which animals are mere natural 
automata, machines with neither soul nor 
capacity for experiencing pain and suffering.  
This doctrine served the dual function of 
justifying the “ascendancy of man” and 
absolving them of their guilt by providing 
“by far the best rationalization yet for the 
human exploitation of animals” (Patterson 
24).  Thus, a fissure develops between the 
immediate experience of the animal in pain 
and a comfortable, reflective assurance that 
this pain is an illusion.  This obfuscation 
creates the conditions for a cold economic 
calculus to hold sway over the relationship – 
the animal is no longer a being as such but 
rather a number, a product, and the face can 
no longer communicate its vulnerability or 
destitution. Stanescu documents two 
particularly telling examples: 
"From the journal of Hog Farm 
Management: 'Forget the pig is an 
animal. Treat him just like a machine 
in a factory. Schedule treatments like 
you would lubrication. Breeding 
season like the first step in an 
assembly line. And marketing like the 
delivery of finished goods.' This next 
quotation is from Farmer and 
Stockbreeder: 'The modern layer 
[that’s a chicken used just for her 
ability to produce eggs. Broilers are 
the chickens we kill to eat] is, after all, 
only a very efficient converting 
machine changing the raw material—
feedstuffs—into the finished product—
the egg—less, of course, maintenance 
requirements' (The Abattoir of 
Humanity 79). 
There are other, seemingly innocuous 
examples: as Pachirat writes in his study, 
“live cattle in the chutes are referred to as 
“beef,’ as in ‘Hey, guys, that beef has fallen 
down in the pens’” (230).  The trick of 
language employed here is to ‘frame’ the 
animal in terms of its resulting product.  The 
cow is no longer considered as such, but is 
rather a large, messy, and loud vessel of 
“raw materials,” such that “the animals are 
already beef even before they have been 
shot or bled” (230). 
Once the rhetorical death of the 
individual has taken place, by whatever 
means, there remains the question of 
technique.  One cannot rely on the reframing 
of the victim alone to effect a complete 
dissociation between the killer and the 
killed, and in order to maximize efficiency 
the method of killing itself must be pacified, 
rendered neutral.  This process is subtle, and 
in fact may be nearly invisible in many 
cases: “[i]nnocents murdered in war become 
‘collateral damage’; the condemned are 
‘executed’; countries are ‘pacified’ and their 
native populations ‘dispersed’ in ‘mopping-
up operations’; ‘kinetic operations’ 
‘neutralize’ and ‘liquidate’ their ‘targets’” 
(Pachirat 32).  The ascendancy of drone 
technology, enabled in part by its 
unprecedented level of physical detachment, 
has seen this rhetoric continue unabated: 
“The USAF issues terse daily airpower 
summaries in which Predators and Reapers 
are said to provide ‘armed overwatch for 
friendly forces’ and ‘release precision-
guided munitions’ that destroy ‘enemy 
positions’, ‘targets’ and ‘vehicles’” 
(Gregory 204).  Grossman notes that, in 
addition to the verbal pacification of 
technique, “[e]ven the weapons themselves 
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receive benign names - Puff the Magic 
Dragon, Walleye, TOW, Fat Boy and Thin 
Man - the killing weapon of the individual 
soldiers becomes a piece or a hog, and a 
bullet becomes a round” (93).  Similarly, 
one “does,” “makes,” or “harvests” the 
animal rather than kills it (Vialles 56-57). 
Swimming in this sea of euphemism 
inevitably serves to construct an alternative 
reality, one in which the core truth of the 
activity is rendered unspeakable and vulgar. 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout the course of this study, one 
might begin to wonder whether the premise 
– that the inability to see the Other subverts 
normal empathetic feedback mechanisms 
that otherwise serve as a powerful deterrent 
to killing – is not, on the face of it, 
demonstrably false.  In the digital age, one 
need only turn on the nightly news to see 
grotesque depictions of the results of 
violence around the globe.  Andrew 
Hoskins, Professor of Cultural Studies at the 
University of Nottingham, and Ben 
O’Laughlin, Reader in International 
Relations at Royal Holloway, University of 
London, describe that our present “media 
ecology” as one in which “people, events 
and news media have become increasingly 
connected and interpenetrated through the 
technological compressions of space-time” 
(18).  They relate this constant barrage of 
information to the hypothesis of 
‘compassion fatigue,’ which occurs “when 
we tire of media coverage of suffering, pain 
and death in wars, conflicts and catastrophes 
close to or, more typically, far from home” 
(37).  It logically follows that whatever is to 
blame for the lack of emotional response 
and popular opposition to mass killing in our 
modern age, it is likely not the lack of 
information or media portrayal.  The 
philosopher and cultural critic Slavoj Žižek, 
not uncharacteristically, takes this point 
further: in the context of Aquinas’ argument 
that “the blessed in the Kingdom of Heaven 
will be allowed to see the damned being 
punished so that their own bliss will that 
much more delightful” (218), he suggests 
that the sight of the suffering Other is hardly 
a weight on our moral conscience.  In fact, 
“the sight of the other’s suffering is the objet 
a, the obscure cause of desire which sustains 
our own happiness – take it away, and our 
bliss appears in all its sterile stupidity” 
(220).  The question that clearly needs to be 
asked is whether the traumatic reality is not 
the violence itself, but that should it be on 
display it would not actually mobilize an 
effective opposition.  Why does the sight of 
violence on our televisions and social media 
feeds not outrage us enough to demand that 
it be stopped? 
We can, at this point, again apply 
Žižek’s insight to suggest a possible answer 
to the seeming discord between the 
argument articulated in this study and the 
ubiquity of violence in media: 
"To those sitting inside a car, outside 
reality appears slightly distant, the 
other side of a barrier or screen 
materialized by the glass. We 
perceive external reality, the world 
outside the car, as "another reality," 
another mode of reality, not 
immediately continuous with the 
reality inside the car. The proof of 
this discontinuity is the uneasy 
feeling that overwhelms us when we 
suddenly roll down the windowpane 
and allow external reality to strike us 
with the proximity of its material 
presence" (Looking Awry 15). 
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The windowpane acts as a barrier to 
reality; we are, minimally, both 
disconnected from and numb to what takes 
place on the other side of the glass.  Taking 
this brief phenomenological analysis further, 
it would seem that a screen – whether a 
window, a computer, or a television – 
renders impossible a truly unmediated, 
visceral experience of what it shows.  In the 
digital age, despite our unlimited access to 
information, the face-to-face experience 
remains blunted by the medium.  Butler 
argues to this effect: “Indeed, the 
photographed face seemed to conceal or 
displace the face in the Levinasian sense, 
since we saw and heard through that face no 
vocalization of grief or agony, no sense of 
the precariousness of life” (Precarious Life 
142).  The ethical relationship, the 
experience of infinity, must “strike us with 
the proximity of its material presence” if it is 
to have its true effect.  To become obligated, 
to be called into question by a radical 
exposure to vulnerability and precarity, 
one’s experience of the Other must be 
unmediated.  “We cannot, under 
contemporary conditions of representation, 
hear the agonized cry or be compelled or 
commanded by the face” (151).  The face-
to-face must take place in the flesh. 
Real, interpersonal experience, 
unmediated by distance or euphemism, is 
therefore a prerequisite to any rational 
deliberation and ethical discourse.  Levinas’ 
phenomenological account of the experience 
of the Other makes clear that in order to 
become obligated, to act in fidelity to the 
call that comes through the face, one must 
first break down the physical and cognitive 
barriers that would otherwise conceal it.  
Transparency, reclaiming those areas of our 
experience that have become distorted or 
denied to us, emerges here as a powerful 
political weapon.  An understanding of the 
processes at work in these spheres can help 
to illuminate other battlegrounds of 
fractured experience.  It is my intention that 
this study point forward to other areas where 
a “politics of sight” may be called for to 
reveal what has been concealed through 
language and geography (Pachirat 240).   
David Harvey, Distinguished Professor of 
Anthropology and Geography at the City 
University of New York, has argued that the 
command of space – and, by extension, 
experience - “is a fundamental and all-
pervasive source of social power in and over 
everyday life” (226).  Through a cocktail of 
apathy, military necessity, and economic 
logic, we have developed a cold, mechanical 
approach to death.  But for all our efforts, it 
remains, and we continue to suppress the 
bodies in order to make it palatable (Lee 
242).  It is these spaces, the “frontiers of 
sequestered experience” (Giddens 169), that 
demand our attention. One can only hope 
that “[u]nder the light of everyone’s gaze, 
under our gaze, they will wither and shrivel 
up, scorched by the heat of our disgust, our 
horror, our pity, and the political action 
these reactions engender” (Pachirat 247).     
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